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After the ﬂooding in 2002 European governments provided billions
of Euros of ﬁnancial assistance to their citizens. Although there is no
doubt that solidarity and some sort of assistance is reasonable, the
question arises why these damages were not suﬃciently insured. One
explanation why individuals reject to obtain insurance cover against
natural hazards is that they anticipate governmental and private aid.
This problem became to be known as ”charity hazard”. The present
paper gives an economic analysis of the institutional arrangements
on the market for natural disaster insurances focusing on imperfec-
tions caused by governmental ﬁnancial relief. It provides a theoretical
explanation why charity hazard is a problem on the market for nat-
ural disaster insurances, in the way that it acts as an obstacle for
the proper diﬀusion and therefore the establishment of natural hazard
insurances. This paper provides a review of the scientiﬁc discussion
on charity hazard, provides a theoretical analysis and points out the
existing empirical problems regarding this issue.
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11 Introduction
Damages from natural catastrophes or elementary losses are worldwide on
the rise. However, insurance providers have either got problems to provide
attractive insurance coverage against natural hazards or are constantly with-
drawing such products from the market. In addition, individuals do not seem
to demand such insurance coverage. Surveys of the insurance industry have
shown that in European countries without mandatory insurance coverage a)
the demand for ﬂood insurance is very low and as a result b) the private
ﬂood insurance cover in some countries reaches a density of about 10% (Guy
Carpenter 2005, Swiss Re 1998). A continuously growing number of schol-
ars applied diﬀerent approaches in order to explain the imperfections on the
market for natural hazard insurances. One issue that has so far received only
minor attention (e.g. Browne & Hoyt (2000), Lewis & Nickerson (1989)) is
the problem of ”charity hazard”. Charity hazard deﬁnes individuals’ tendency
not to insure or take any other mitigation measures as a result of the reliance
on expected ﬁnancial assistance from federal relief programs or donations by
other individuals. Lewis & Nickerson (1989), Prettenthaler, Hyll & Vetters
(2004) and Schwarze & Wagner (2004) have already mentioned the possible
negative eﬀects of the availability of governmental and private aid on the indi-
vidual’s decision to obtain insurance coverage against elementary losses. Due
to the complexity of the market for natural hazard insurances, Kunreuther
(2001) suggests that speciﬁc programs to reduce market imperfections in this
area demand a comprehensive analysis of the decision processes of all involved
institutions and agents.
One approach to examine the problem of charity hazard in such a compre-
hensive way is an economic analysis of alternative institutional arrangements.
This approach is also based on the model of the ”homo oeconomicus” that
maximizes its utility under certain constraints. However, additionally this
approach assumes that the institutional framework aﬀects individuals’ ac-
tions and conversely institutions evolve from human activity (Frey 1990b).
Moreover, it is essential to carry out the analysis on actual existing insti-
tutions and not some ideal models of institutions (Frey 1990a). Applied to
2the market imperfection analysed in this paper, one can view ”governmen-
tal relief” as part of the institutional arrangements in which individuals act.
Depending on the degree of institutionalisation of governmental relief, indi-
viduals’ decisions to obtain insurance coverage against natural hazards might
be inﬂuenced. Additionally, each individual’s decision to insure further af-
fects the spread of natural hazard insurances. The analysis of the eﬀects of
certain policies on individual behavior builds a base for a) suggestions on how
to change ineﬃcient institutional arrangements and b) developing alternative
ﬁnancial and policy instruments.
This paper shows that failures and imperfections exist on the market
for natural hazard insurances and therefore state intervention may help to
overcome these problems. Speciﬁc forms of state intervention, namely gov-
ernmental ﬁnancial assistance after a catastrophic event, can create further
distortions on the market and therefore present an inappropriate form of
state intervention. So far, a lot of economic papers have been written about
the potential sources of imperfections or failure of the market for natural
hazard insurance. In this paper we focus on the speciﬁc issue of charity
hazard. Charity hazard is a problem on the market for natural disaster in-
surances, in the way that it acts as an obstacle for the proper diﬀusion and
therefore establishment of natural hazard insurance. So far the governmental
budgets were roughly able to cope with the costs of post-catastrophe relief
activities. Nevertheless, limited public ﬁnances and steadily increasing ﬁ-
nancial damages from natural hazards, demand a more eﬃcient allocation
of public resources. This requires in return the elimination of ineﬃcient al-
locative mechanisms and policies and the replacement by more eﬃcient and
acceptable mechanisms and instruments.
The paper is structured as followed: Section 2 of the paper reviews the
existing literature on possible explanations for market failure occurring on
the natural hazard insurance market. Section 3 highlights the economics of
governmental disaster assistance. In the section 3.2. the problem of charity
hazard is introduced and analysed from a theoretical point of view. Section
3.2 gives an overview on potential solutions to the problem and section 4
concludes with a short summary and suggestions for future research.
32 Imperfections on the market for Natural
Hazard insurances
Individual insurance behavior is mainly ananlysed in the context of expected-
utility-theory. The work by Ehrlich & Becker (1972) provides a formal frame-
work analysing individual insurance behavior. If insurance is available at ac-
tuarially fair premiums, the individual equalises the income in both states (no
loss vs. loss) by obtaining full insurance coverage. However, reality very often
deviates from this ideal model. The insurance market is strongly aﬀected by
uncertainty and the future behavior of the contract partners (insurer and in-
sured), which do not automatically obtain all the available information they
need. The individual who wants to purchase insurance cover against natural
hazards has to put in eﬀort to search for the right insurance company, gain
information about the best contract conditions, compare diﬀerent premiums
and enforce the claim after damage occurred. On the opposite, the insur-
ance company has to put in eﬀort to obtain information about each of his
customers risk in order to calculate the right premiums and control that his
customers do not exploit the fact that they are insured and show more risk
appetite. All these eﬀorts to gain information induce transaction costs. The
existence of transformation costs explains that sometimes information on the
insurance market is unevenly distributed between the contract partners. This
problem of asymmetric information is one of the basic explanations why the
insurance market does not work perfectly or a market does not exist at all.
The resulting phenomena of adverse selection and moral hazard seem to be
the reason for most of the problems on today’s insurance markets. Rothschild
& Stiglitz (1976) analysed the former in a Nash-equilibrium model. An equi-
librium on the insurance market can only exist if two types of contracts, one
for the ”‘good risks”’ and one for the ”‘bad risks”’ yield to a separating equi-
librium. Based on these assumption today’s natural hazard insurance com-
panies as well as federal insurance programs have implemented geographical
underwriting and diﬀerentiate premiums by individual probability of loss.
The NFIP adjusts its premiums according to ﬂood hazard information from
”Flood Insurance Rate Maps”(FIRMs) (FEMA 2002). In Germany the ”elec-
4tronic ﬂood zoning system” (Z¨ URS) enables insurance companies to assess
ﬂood risks to individual buildings (Falkenhagen 2002).
The theoretical model by Ehrlich & Becker (1972) builds a straight-
forward framework to analyse the phenomenon of moral hazard. On the
one hand it shows that market insurance and activities to reduce the amount
of potential loss (self-insurance) are actual substitutes. On the other hand,
measures decreasing the probability of a damage (self-protection) might have
a negative diminishing eﬀect on the insurance premium (given risk-related
pricing) and can thus act as a complement to market insurance. In general,
they conclude that moral hazard is an ”‘inevitable consequence of market
insurance”’. Control measures for moral hazard are for example deductibles,
coinsurance or the exclusion from coverage. Apart from these basic expla-
nations for failure of insurance markets Jaﬀee & Russell (2003) suggest that
adverse selection and moral hazard are not suﬃcient in all cases to explain
the failures on the market for natural hazard insurances. The insurance mar-
ket for natural hazards diﬀers in certain points from other insurance markets,
like car insurances:
ˆ the correlation between individual risks is higher
ˆ the impact or possible loss is much higher
ˆ as a result, the costs to keep the market running are higher
These speciﬁc features can be catalysts for further disturbances on the
market for natural hazard insurances. The characteristics of the risk at hand
might impede transaction costs on the individual. A recent publication by
Kunreuther & Pauly (2004) include this idea into a formal model of deci-
sion making costs under imperfect information and show that individuals
still refuse to purchase natural hazard insurance even if the premiums are
attractive. The authors show that the demand-side ineﬃciency is a prob-
lem of a) transaction costs in order to obtain information and b) ambiguity
about probability estimations by diﬀerent insurance companies. The search
for the optimal insurance imposes costs which are high enough to discourage
the individual to engage in any further mitigation activity. Additionally the
5insurance premiums are likely to be much higher, because of vagueness about
the probabilities.
In general, the demand for insurances is described by the expected-utility
theory. Nevertheless, individuals show diﬀerent behavior in the case of nat-
ural hazards and do not follow the expected utility theory of insurances and
as a result obtain less insurance coverage. A growing number of publications
have developed diﬀerent approaches to explain the demand for natural haz-
ard insurances. Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky (1982) argue that individuals’
decisions are subject to choice anomalies. This theory of anomalies proposes
that the standard expected utility theory does not suﬃciently describe and
predict individual behavior under uncertainty (Frey & Eichenberger 1989).
When it comes to natural hazards, individuals do not base their decisions on
calculated probabilities, but rather use inferential rules known as heuristics
(Kahneman et al. 1982). This suggestion can be applied on the market for
natural hazard insurance as well, where the situation is called ”natural disas-
ter syndrome”. This ”is a term that links the lack of interest by those at risk in
protecting themselves against hazards and the resulting signiﬁcant ﬁnancial
burden on society, property owners, the insurance industry and municipal,
state and federal governments when severe disasters do occur” (Kunreuther
(2001) p. 301). The author points out that ﬁve heuristics are responsible
for anomalies on the natural disaster insurance market. One main reason is
connected to information biases. Individuals misperceive the risk of natural
disasters, because of extensive media-coverage (”availability bias”) or they
tend to overestimate risks of being harmed by a natural hazard that has
recently occurred. A second very typical heuristic in the area of natural haz-
ard insurance is the common attitude: ”It won’t happen to me!”. If we take
the example of a mountain farmer who has been living his whole live in an
area with high avalanche risk (red zone) where almost every year avalanches
impact next to his farm. Nevertheless, although he would have incentives to
either move away or to insure his farm against potential losses, he does not
behave accordingly. The third heuristic refers to the role of emotions con-
nected to catastrophic events. Individuals may purchase insurances because
of feelings such as fear instead of weigh costs against beneﬁts. Heuristic
6number four originates during the risk communication process. The form
how risks and probabilities are presented can have a huge impact on individ-
uals’ decisions. For example, the actual danger to die from an avalanche is
perceived to be moderate by some people at the level 3 (considerable dan-
ger) of the European avalanche hazard scale. Information about the fact
that at this stage the highest number of avalanche victims occurs, changes
the individual’s attitude towards avalanche risks tremendously, although the
probability to get caught by an avalanche did not change at all. The ﬁfth
heuristic is concerned with the ambiguity about the probability that a nat-
ural disaster might occur. This vague probabilities lead to ineﬃciencies on
the private insurance market.
Beside theoretical models and approaches empirical evidence concerning
the demand for natural hazard insurance exists. Browne & Hoyt (2000)
provide an econometric analysis and test several variables inﬂuencing the de-
mand for ﬂood insurance in the USA from 1983 to 1993. The ﬁxed-eﬀects
model uses cross-sectional and time-series data from 50 states. Their ﬁnd-
ings suggest that the price level of the premiums has got a highly signiﬁcant
and negative impact on the demand for insurance cover. They also show
that higher income is positively related to the demand for ﬂood insurance.
Further they conﬁrm the hypothesis that a recent ﬂood experience increases
the demand for insurance cover. Although the study presents interesting
and new results in this area, it provides no information why the demand
for ﬂood insurance is sometimes too low. Brookshire, Thayer, Tschirhat
& Schulze (1985) and Troy & Romm (2004) examined how the disclosure
of information on natural hazard risks inﬂuences price gradients in hedonic
market analyses. Brookshire et al. (1985) compare the price gradients for
earthquake safety in the Los Angeles and San Francisco areas before and
after the Alquist-Priolo Act was passed in 1974 which provided the society
with information concerning relative earthquake-associated risk by designat-
ing areas of elevated relative risk. Similarly, Troy & Romm (2004) compare
price gradients on non-ﬂoodplain areas before and after the 1998 California
Natural Hazard Disclosure Law. Both studies ﬁnd no price diﬀerential be-
tween risky and safe areas before the laws have been passed, but large and
7signiﬁcant price diﬀerentials thereafter. The studies show importance of the
distribution of information and show that biases and imperfections on the
market could be an issue of transaction costs rather than heuristics.
According to Jaﬀee & Russell (2003) the magnitude and features of natu-
ral hazards can also lead to three imperfections on the supply side of the in-
surance market: First, the problem of asymmetrically distributed information
between the insurance company and its clients as well as between the share-
holders of such a company and the management. Second, bankruptcy and
agency costs stemming from the bankruptcy risk and the risk-management
costs avoiding prospective bankruptcies. Third, impediments to raise capital
as elementary losses from a big natural catastrophe often exceed the annual
insurance premiums by a factor of 10 up to a factor of 100. To cover these po-
tential losses the insurance company is required to raise substantial capital.
Existing tax and accounting laws limit the company’s ability to retain earn-
ings and thus create fundamental problems in this area. As we can see, the
supply-side problems on the market for natural hazard insurance are large
and can explain why insurance coverage against elementary losses is hardly
oﬀered on the market. Jaﬀee & Russell (2003) as well as Schwarze & Wagner
(2004) provide a thorough analysis of these supply-side problems and develop
concepts to counteract them.
3 The economics of governmental disaster re-
lief
The character and magnitude of catastrophic risk in general and the re-
lated imperfections on the natural disaster insurance market in particular
can be seen as a normative basis for government intervention in the area
of risk transfer. Government intervention on the market for disaster insur-
ances is found in diﬀerent designs: The provision of insurance cover through
the government, such as the NFIP in the U.S. and governmental ﬁnancial
disaster relief through ad-hoc transfers or an institutionalized catastrophe
fund. One advantage of governmental insurance systems is that it can sig-
8niﬁcantly constrain the problem of adverse selection and increase the size
of the insurance pool by introducing mandatory insurance. In addition, the
introduction of certain command & control instruments such as mandatory
building codes reduces the probability of moral hazard. For example un-
der the mandatory insurance system in Switzerland the monopoly insurance
companies in each (Kantonale Gebaeudeversicherungen) have got the power
to impose conditions regarding self-protection on the private housing own-
ers. Depending on the design governmental insurance system can also have
speciﬁc disadvantages compared to private providers of natural hazard in-
surance (Priest 1996). The focus of this paper,however, lies on the eﬀects
and incentives of governmental disaster relief. From an economist’s point of
view two major problems emerge: First, costs on society emerging from the
ineﬃcient allocation of governmental disaster relief. Second, underinsurance
of individuals as a result of anticipated governmental assistance - charity
hazard.
3.1 Ineﬃcient provision of ﬁnancial assistance
One major problem of governmental relief is allocative failure that prevents
the ﬁnancial resources from reaching those who suﬀered the greatest damage.
(Sobel & Leeson 2006) concludes that such allocative ineﬃciencies are simply
informational problem. First, disaster victims have no incentive to reveal
their preferences for disaster assistance to governmental agents. Second, as
federal disaster assistance is available for free there are no prices to guide
its allocation. In addition, Governmental agents have weaker incentives to
carefully deal with their resources and to search for information where the
disaster assistance is needed the most.
Governmental disaster relief can also be subject to political concerns e.g.
re-election constraints. An econometric analysis by Garrett & Sobel (2003)
ﬁnds that FEMA disaster expenditure is signiﬁcantly higher in election years
(around $140 million as compared to non-election years). They conclude that
almost half of FEMA disaster payments are politically motivated. Besley &
Burgess (2002) ﬁnd similar results for governmental food distribution after
9crop ﬂood damage using panel data from India. Mustafa (2003) interviewed
victims of the 2001 ﬂood in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, Pakistan regarding
their experiences with diﬀerent sources of disaster relief. Support cheques for
ﬂood victims were mainly distributed to political supporters or family mem-
bers of the local councilors responsible for the coordination of governmental
assistance (Mustafa 2003). Shughart (2006) gives a comprehensive overview
on bureaucratic waste of federal resources following hurricane ”Katrina”.
3.2 The problem of ”Charity Hazard”
During the summer of 1997 the Polish government spent around 500 million $
(around 3 % of the polish GDP) on ﬁnancial assistance to the victims of ﬂoods
(Stripple 1998). In the immediate aftermath of the catastrophic ﬂooding in
2002 the regional and central German governments provided around half a
billion Euro of emergency relief to their citizens (Schwarze & Wagner 2004).
The Austrian government paid around 500 Million Euro of ﬁnancial relief
to its citizens (Prettenthaler et al. 2004). Shortly after Hurricane ”Katrina”
struck New Orleans the US senate voted almost U$ 60 billion in federal
disaster relief (Kunreuther 2006).
The ﬁnancial assistance was helpful for the victims after this once-a-
century ﬂooding. However, this type of governmental assistance might be
the reason for another demand-side failure on the natural hazard insurance
market. The problem of charity hazard emerges when individuals underinsure
or do not insure at all against certain losses because of expected governmen-
tal aid and private charity. For simplicity reasons this paper focuses solely
on governmental aid as a source for charity hazard.
Basically charity hazard is just a speciﬁcation of the moral hazard prob-
lem. Governmental ﬁnancial relief is a premium-free insurance against natu-
ral disasters. If a catastrophe occurs individuals without insurance are better
oﬀ, because of the ﬁnancial support without having to pay premiums, than
they would have been if the situation was left to the market (Prettenthaler
et al. 2004). This discourages the purchase of insurance cover especially if
the amount of post-catastrophe ﬁnancial relief depends on the degree of the
10insurance cover. The low demand for natural disaster insurances has also
got eﬀects on the supply-side of the market, the insurance companies. Some
of the providers retreat from the market because it is unproﬁtable to oﬀer
insurance cover against natural hazards. The remaining providers have to
increase the premiums in order to cover costs. This leads to an even lower
supply at higher prices. In this situation fewer and fewer individuals tend to
cover potential risks from natural disasters by insurances and rely on gov-
ernmental aid in the case of emergency. Figure 1 summarizes this circular
process.
Actual examples for governmental relief programs are the European Union
relief fund, the disaster assistance programs in several states in the USA (e.g.
California Disaster Assistance Act) or the Austrian catastrophe fund (Katas-
trophenfonds). The ﬁnancial sources for these federal reliefs are the govern-
ments’ budgets. For example, the catastrophe fund in Austria is ﬁnanced
through income and corporate taxes. The emergency relief provided by the
German and Austrian governments after the 2002 ﬂooding was to some ex-
tent ﬁnanced by delaying planned tax reduction. An additional analysis of
the allocative ineﬃciencies in the public sector (political failures) should be
the scope of further research interest in this area.
It is perfectly rational behavior not to obtain insurance cover against po-
tential losses, when one can expect ﬁnancial support from the government
in the case of natural disasters Coate (1995). Private insurance cover inﬂicts
costs (search costs and premiums), while the support from the government
is available for free. The paradox of the situation is that people often have
no actual legal entitlement for any ﬁnancial relief by the government. This
suggests that the existence of a governmental relief fund, past personal expe-
rience and/or media reports of past catastrophes and governmental aid seem
to substantiate the individuals’ belief that the government will provide ﬁ-
nancial catastrophe assistance. Prettenthaler et al. (2004) further argue that
the societal legitimization to rely solely on governmental relief might result
from the ideas and/or beliefs that a) in general individuals can not be made
responsible for natural catastrophes and their eﬀects, b) the government has
to restore social and economic order after an event, and c) the low numbers
11of insured properties is not just a fault of the victims, but also of the govern-
ment as it did not assure the proper supply of natural catastrophe insurances
and protective measures in general.
In addition to this societal legitimization, an institutionalisation of gov-
ernmental aid by politicians and the administration might even further en-
force the individuals’ anticipation for ﬁnancial assistance from the govern-
ment. Such an institutionalisation can have various characteristics:
1. The creation of a catastrophe fund that does not only provide ﬁnancial
relief for one speciﬁc event, but is a persistent institution that grants
ﬁnancial assistance for elementary losses throughout the year.
2. The governmental aid has some sort of formalisation and/or legal foun-
dations such as speciﬁc laws. This can be laws that explicitly deﬁne
the ﬁnancial sources of the governmental relief and the way how the
ﬁnancial assistance is distributed among the victims in the case of a
natural catastrophe.
3. The governmental relief is administrated by special bureaucratic iden-
tity.
4. Even if there is no particular agency, oﬃce or person responsible for
governmental relief, the existence of guidelines that inform the indi-
viduals about how and where to obtain governmental aid or speciﬁc
application forms for ﬁnancial assistance might enforce the belief of
support by the government.
This institutionalisation can support the peoples’ anticipation of pub-
lic charity and further impede insurance attempts and thus the diﬀusion of
natural hazard insurances. Kunreuther (2006) argued that although stud-
ies revealed that individuals do not anticipate governmental assistance, the
broad media coverage on disaster assistance following hurricane ”Katrina”
could change public views on this subject.
123.2.1 Theoretical background
Governmental assistance after a natural disaster basically reduces the indi-
viduals’ liability for the ﬁnancial damages and therefore sets incentives to un-
derinsure or not insure at all. Various authors have developed formal models
derived from expected utility theory that analyse these incentive structures
and its eﬀects on indivudal insurance behavior. Lewis & Nickerson (1989)
were upon the ﬁrst translating the idea that people underinsure, because
of expected governmental assistance into a formal model. Buchanan (1975)
showed that the government is unable not to provide ﬁnancial assistance for
the poor and termed this situation Samaritan’s Dilemma. Based on this
assumption Coate (1995) created a model in which the amount of public
transfers depends on the degree of the potential victim’s insurance coverage.
An ineﬃcient situation from the dilemma situation occurs if the government
can commit not to help the victims.
Arvan & Nickerson (2000) and Arvan & Nickerson (2006) analyzed the
incentive structure in a game between potential victims and a social planner
who is responsible for public assistance. Similar to the work by (Coate 1995)
and Lewis & Nickerson (1989) they argue that it is rational for individuals
to underinsure given expected governmental assistance. Their explanation
for this behavior, however, diﬀers from earlier papers as they endogenized
governmental compensation. An individual’s purchase of insurance coverage
creates negative externalities by reducing the uncovered part not only of the
individual’s wealth, but also of the uncovered property of all individuals at
risk and therefore the fraction eligible for governmental compensation. Un-
derinsurance leads to a Nash-equilibrium among all potential victims. Char-
ity hazard can thus be explained through such an equilibrium rather than
the Samaritan’s Dilemma.
Kelly & Kleﬀner (2003) developed a theoretical framework analysing the
demand for insurance and mitigation measures if individuals can expect gov-
ernmental disaster relief. The numerical simulation shows that governmental
aid decreases the amount spent on insurance as well as mitigation measures.
13Kim & Schlesinger (2005) introduced government-guaranteed subsistence
levels to a model of insurance market with adverse selection. Governmental
assistance can alter the set of separating-equilibrium contracts. Depending
on the level of relief, high-risk individuals might fully insure whereby low-risk
individuals might have incentives to rely on governmental aid.
3.2.2 Formal Analysis
According to the framework developed by Ehrlich & Becker (1972) and the
extension by Kelly & Kleﬀner (2003)the individual is endowed with an initial
wealth W and faces two states of the world (1,2). A determined loss L oc-
curs with a probability π (0 < π < 1) in state 1. The individual has got the
possibility to purchase insurance cover, V (α), against the potential loss. The
price of the insurance, P, is a function of α, the proportion of the individ-
ual’s property covered by the insurance. In addition, it is assumed that the
premiums for insurance are actuarially fair. Under these basic assumptions,
the individual will choose that amount of insurance coverage that equalizes
the incomes in both states of the world. In ﬁgure 1 this is represented by
point C, which equals full insurance coverage.
In addition to this basic model, the individual can also expect that the
government provides ﬁnancial disaster relief θ (0 < θ < 1). Basically, the
government pays for a fraction, (1 − θ), of the uninsured damage. The indi-
vidual’s utility function can now be derived as follows:
Max
α E [U] = πU {W − P (α)(1 − θ)(L − V (α))}+(1 − π)U {W − P (α)}
(1)
Diﬀerentiating equation (1) with respect to the amount of insurance cov-
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(2)
The utility-maximizing individual obtains an amount of insurance cover-
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(3)
In equilibrium, the individual purchases that amount of insurance cover
where the slope of the insurance line equals the slope of the indiﬀerence curve
between the two states of the world. In comparison to the basic model, the
amount of insurance coverage demanded now also depends on the expected
ﬁnancial assistance by the government, θ.
In ﬁgure 1 we consider 3 diﬀerent levels of governmental assistance, θ1 <
θ2 < θ3. The individual’s wealth after an event occured depends now on
the initial wealth, the premium paid, the insurance cover and the degree of
disaster relief by the government, W +Gi where Gi = −P(α)−(1−θi)(L−
V (α)). Assuming a governmental disaster assistance of θ1, the individual can
choose a wealth situation with no coverage at point A or a situation with
full coverage at point C. Given fair insurance premiums, the individual can
obtain a higher utility level by choosing full insurance cover at point C. At
a higher level of governmental aid, such as θ2, the individual is indiﬀerent
between not insuring D and full coverage. At an even higher amount of
disaster assistance, θ3, the individual is better oﬀ (utility level I2 in ﬁgure 1)





















W W − P(α)
Figure 1: Individual insurance behavior and governmental relief
163.2.3 Empirical research
The problem of charity hazard and its eﬀects on individual insurance behav-
ior seems pretty straight-forward and convincing at least from a theoretical
perspective. However, when it comes to empirical evidence for this issue,
only few empirical studies exist and the results are rather ambiguous. A
study by Kunreuther, Ginsberg, Miller, Slovic, B. & Katz (1978) revealed
that the majority of homeowners in hazard prone areas do not anticipate
federal ﬁnancial disaster relief. The empirical results by Browne & Hoyt
(2000) oppose the idea of charity hazard. Their ﬁndings even suggest a sig-
niﬁcant positive relation between the amount of governmental disaster relief
and the demand for ﬂood insurance in the USA. They argue that the expo-
sure to ﬂood risk might increase both, the purchases of ﬂood insurance and
the amount of governmental aid received. Asseldonk, Meuwissen & Huirne
(2002) measured the demand for a hypothetical public-private crop insur-
ance scheme by interviewing 305 crop producers in the Netherlands with the
contingent-valuation method. The producer’s belief in potential governmen-
tal disaster assistance had a signiﬁcant negative impact on the likelihood to
participate in the insurance program.
This short overview on studies indicates that it is diﬃcult to support
the theoretical arguments for charity hazard with empirical evidence. First,
there are only few empirical studies that have dealt with this subject. Second,
the main focus of these studies was on other topics related to natural hazard
insurance and incorporated governmental disaster relief only as an additional
control variable. Third, the results are conﬂicting and the majority of studies
actually rejects the idea of charity hazard. Therefore, future research should
a) develop theoretical models that incorporate governmental assistance in
a more concise manner, b) formulate hypothesis focusing more tightly on
charity hazard and c) design the econometric speciﬁcations regarding to point
a) and b).
173.3 Alternatives
There are a number of options and policy recommendations available to solve
the charity hazard problem: The ﬁrst possibility is to introduce mandatory
natural hazard insurance, a strategy already applied to counteract adverse
selection in other insurance markets (e.g. car insurance). As a positive side-
eﬀect the premiums would decrease and make the natural hazard insurance
more attractive. A legal intervention by the government would thus not only
tackle the diﬀusion problem of natural hazard insurances, but also help to
overcome the choice anomalies in this area (Frey 1990a).
From a theoretical point of view, Coate (1995) suggests that the gov-
ernment has to ensure that everyone (irrespective of personal income) has
insurance cover in order to create an eﬃcient situation. This can be achieved
through in-kind transfers of insurance. Another option to avoid charity haz-
ard would be to reduce or completely cancel governmental aid (Niederle
2003). Nevertheless it could be politically disastrous to deny ﬁnancial assis-
tance to victims of a natural catastrophe. Therefore the government should
rethink its support strategy and focus even more on the prevention and thus
on the mitigation of elementary losses. Additionally a redirection of govern-
mental aid from post-event relief to pre-event subsidies for insurances would
decrease the individual costs of obtaining insurance coverage and make there-
fore the insurance solution more attractive. For example in Austria parts of
the catastrophe fund is used to subsidize insurance premiums against dam-
ages due to hail and frost. However, the subsidisation option in this respect
demands a further analysis. Frey (1990a) suggests that state intervention
through subsidies might even increase the existing anomalies on the market.
If public fund are collected and aggregated over time and stored on a
dedicated account, this money could be used to ﬁnance a public-private part-
nership within the natural hazard insurance sector. The private insurance
companies supply primary insurance cover, whereby the government pro-
vides re-insurance cover in the case of a once-a-century event (Schwarze &
Wagner 2004). This solution would in addition tackle the problem of pos-
sible bankruptcy and the costs of avoiding it (see discussion above). The
18international comparison presents a number of diﬀerent solutions. Switzer-
land has solved the problem by introducing mandatory insurance for build-
ings with a dual system. In 19 cantons the property insurance is oﬀered
by a monopoly insurance company (Kantonale Gebaeudeversicherung), in
the other 7 cantons property owners can purchase the insurance from pri-
vate providers. Spain has also got obligatory property insurance (Consorcio
de Compensacion de Seguros) against natural hazards (ﬂood, storm, earth-
quakes) oﬀered by a state monopoly (Von Ungern-Sternberg 2004). In the
United States the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) - a legal frame-
work for cooperation between private insurance companies and the govern-
ment created in 1968 - builds the basis mandatory ﬂood insurance for new
buildings (Burby 2001).
Although superior models have been developed in economic theory and
these alternative mechanisms have been successfully applied in diﬀerent coun-
tries, the implementation of alternative insurance systems against the ele-
mentary losses in certain countries (e.g. Austria, Germany, Italy) still fails.
Whether an alternative social risk transfer mechanism will be installed cru-
cially depends on a) the incentives of winners and losers to support their
interests and b) the position to exert inﬂuence within the institutional con-
text. Although alternative insurance systems might be be more eﬃcient and
reduce the burden on both victims and tax-payers reforms in this area are
unlikely to pass the political-process (Raschky & Weck-Hannemann 2006).
A case study by Schwarze & Wagner (2006) gives a good political-economic
examination how the introduction of a mandatory insurance system in Ger-
many failed.
4 Charity Hazard - A politico-economic Anal-
ysis
The compensation of ﬁnancial losses after natural disasters is essential for
the social and economic functioning of a society. There is general consensus
at the level of the formulation of the aim at the beginning of the political
19process, when the costs of social risk transfer are only vaguely known. As
soon as the costs of social risk transfer and, in particular, the groups who
have to bear the costs are identiﬁed, conﬂicts arise. Whether an alternative
social risk transfer mechanism will be installed crucially depends on
ˆ the incentives of winners and losers to support their interests and
ˆ the position to exert inﬂuence within the institutional context.
Hence, the politico-economic analysis of governmental relief consists of
an examination of the behaviour of the actors in the political decision mak-
ing process regarding the beneﬁts and costs of governmental relief (ad-hoc
or catastrophe fund) compared to alternative solutions (e.g. a mandatory
insurance system).
The relevant actors are:




Citizens: Citizens in general, and in particular individuals living in haz-
ard prone areas, have a great interest in a social risk transfer system. In
comparison to a mandatory insurance system governmental relief has several
advantages for citizens. The payment to victims is in general not strictly
formalised and the conditions for payments are not strictly controlled, as the
government wants to guarantee ”fast and un-bureaucratic” help. Costs for
governmental compensation are bared by the general public, through income
or corporate taxes. Although a catastrophe fund is a de-facto ”mandatory
insurance”, the costs are hard to associate. In addition, the allocation of costs
of governmental relief to all citizens is perceived as just, especially after a
disaster occurred. Beside the direct costs citizens have to pay, governmental
20relief has got certain drawbacks in comparison to alternative risk transfer
systems, such as private insurance. Firstly, the victims actually do not have
any legal entitlement for refunding from the government. This creates a sit-
uation of uncertainty for aﬀected individuals. In comparison to an insurance
solution, disaster victims do not obtain any contract which could act as a
security for e.g. a bank loan. Secondly, although politicians announce fast
help, the actual refunding takes time as it has to pass through numerous
bureaucratic hierarchies, from the municipal level to the federal level. The
refunding is organized through bureaucrats who are in general not specialists
for payment and refunding tasks. This puts victims in an uncertain position,
because the amount of the ﬁnancial assistance is unclear and the time when
disaster victims receive it is not ﬁxed.
Hence, one of the biggest beneﬁts from the installation of a mandatory
insurance system stems from a decrease in the victims’ uncertainty. An in-
surance contract entitles the individual with the legal right for compensation
of elementary losses. Even if the payment from the insurance company did
not arrive, the contract enables the disaster victims to loan money for recon-
struction. The introduction of an insurance system based on risk-premiums
would increase the overall eﬃciency of the social risk transfer system. Insur-
ance premiums that are based on the individual’s exposure to ﬂood would
shift the costs of social risk transfer from the general public to the poten-
tial beneﬁciaries. Such a situation would accord to the principle of ﬁscal
equivalence, where the beneﬁciaries of a measure also have to bare the costs.
Despite the advantages of a mandatory insurance system for aﬀected citi-
zens and the tax payers, they only have small incentives to put their interest
forward. The ﬁrst reason is that there is a low degree of organisation be-
tween the citizens. There is no community of interest for the installation of a
more eﬃcient risk transfer system. Second, as the ﬁnancial burden through
governmental relief is perceived as rather low in comparison to other budget
positions, incentives are rather low to take action. Third, the implemen-
tation of alternative risk transfer mechanisms receives only minor attention
in day-to-day politics. However, it becomes relevant once a bigger disaster
occurs (e.g. after the ﬂooding in the western parts of Austria in 2005). Due
21to the general context of the disaster (e.g. attention from the media) the
aﬀected citizens can put more pressure on the political decision makers and
the organization of interests is more facile. Nevertheless, the installation of
a mandatory insurance system is considered as an additional burden for the
aﬀected victims. In the post-disaster context, that group of citizens having
the most inﬂuence on the political decision making process, the victims, has
got no incentives to change the system anyway.
Insurance industry: The insurance industry is the supplier of risk transfer
instruments and services. In general, insurance companies have interest to
replace a governmental relief system by an alternative risk transfer mecha-
nism. The costs and beneﬁts of a mandatory insurance regime for the insur-
ance companies mainly depend on the actual design of the regime. Due to
the supply side failures of the natural hazard insurance market (as discussed
above) a company faces certain risks by oﬀering insurance coverage against
low-probability-high-loss events. Regarding the bankruptcy risk and the as-
sociated agency costs, insurance companies might demand a guarantee that
the government provides some form of insurance of last resort. Such insurance
by the federal government should assure that the market does not collapse,
in particular during the ﬁrst years after the introduction of a mandatory
insurance system. A recent study by Schwarze & Wagner (2006) about the
failed implementation of a mandatory insurance system for elementary losses
in Germany shows how the diverging proposals on the level of federal guar-
antee by the insurance industry and the government might lead to problems
during negotiations. Whether proposals of the insurance industry dominate
the political decision making process, depends on the degree of organization
of the interests of the various insurance providers. It can be assumed, that
the degree of organization of the insurance industry is higher than that of
the citizens.
Politicians & Bureaucrats: Based on public choice theory, politicians and
bureaucrats basically behave in the same way as other members of society.
One cannot assume that their primary interest is to maximize social welfare,
22as suggested by traditional welfare economics. Moreover the political and
bureaucratic actors might be concerned with an increase in their own beneﬁts.
Their activities are constraint by the institutional framework and the design
of the societal decision making mechanisms. Politicians and bureaucrats
face three constraints: 1) re-election constraint b) budget constraint and c)
administrative constraint. They evaluate the costs and beneﬁts of diﬀerent
measurements and policies by the visibility and accountability.
Politicians mainly receive beneﬁts from governmental relief systems. The
provision of funds to disaster victims by a ”benevolent politician”is a highly
visible action. The distribution of tax-money for compensation is perceived
by the general public as generous gesture. Considering the politicians re-
election constraint, ﬁnancial relief can also positive eﬀects. According to the
study by Schwarze & Wagner (2004) the decision by chancellor Schroeder to
provide large amounts of public funds to compensate ﬂood victims in Ger-
many 2002, had positive eﬀects on his re-election in the same year. Relying
on governmental ﬁnancial relief could, however, be a rather risky venture for
the government. Simply consider the occurrence of a ”big-one”in the election
year, when public funds are unable to cope with the damages. Unless politi-
cians are able to shift the blame to a bureaucratic agency (”blame-game”)
the ruling government would be directly accounted for a lack in ﬁnancial
assistance and the bad situation of uncompensated disaster victims. The in-
troduction of a mandatory insurance system would not only insure potential
victims, but also serve as an ”insurance against the political side eﬀects of
low-probability-high-loss-events”for the government. As the compensation is
now task of the insurance companies, they are made responsible for lacking
funds. These beneﬁts bare the costs of losing the highly visible and directly
accountable relief-activity to increase the politicians’ prestige and positive
eﬀects regarding re-election. In addition, the introduction of a mandatory
insurance system may be perceived as an additional tax-burden and directly
accounted to the government. Such a policy would have negative eﬀects on
politicians who cares about re-election.
The second important identity within the political context around govern-
mental relief is bureaucracy. In particular the organization and maintenance
23of a ﬁxed installed catastrophe fund demand to a certain extent bureaucratic
structures. An agency or at least department has to manage and assess the
fund in periods without disaster and has to administrate the distribution
of funds to the victims once a catastrophe occurs. Due to the complexity
of the task ”Natural Hazard Management” that requires expert knowledge
and the societal context of a catastrophe bureaucrats responsible for relief
funds have a rather good position during budget negotiations. They have
only little incentives to demand fewer funds for an upcoming period. This
position also equips them with a certain degree of administrative discretion
for their activities. However, bureaucrats have to face certain risks and costs:
First, the risk of discretionary political decisions. Reserves of a catastrophe
fund could be reduced and transferred to other budget positions (compare
case study in box 1), decreasing the opportunities of the bureaucratic agency.
Second, given a catastrophe arises bureaucrats could become the object of
blame shifting from politicians. Politicians could try to transfer responsibil-
ity for insuﬃcient relief funds to the bureaucratic agency, which reduces the
agency’s prestige in the public and the lay-oﬀ of chief-bureaucrats. Despite
these risks, bureaucrats might have only minor interests in the introduction
of a mandatory insurance system, because this could result in the liquida-
tion of their agency or department. Therefore they might act as a barrier
against the implementation of alternative risk-transfer mechanisms. Next
to politicians, their inﬂuence on the political decision-making process makes
bureaucrats to a key-player when it comes to negotiations about a change in
the societal risk-transfer system. Thus the design of a mandatory insurance
system should include this aspect. The agency could be transformed into an
agency that is responsible for federal re-insurance and other administrative
tasks. This would decrease the bureaucrats’ resistance (as such a change
could even enlarge the agency) and reduce the overall administrative costs,
due to economies of scale. Such a reduction could further lower the insurance
premiums (Von Ungern-Sternberg 2004).
245 Conclusion
Economic theory and empirical evidence show that the market for natu-
ral hazard insurance does not work eﬃciently. A number of reasons for
these market failures both on demand and supply side can be found. Beside
the traditional explanations for market imperfections on insurance markets
- moral hazard and asymmetric information - elementary damages feature
the characteristics of low probability and high loss. These problems lead to
further ineﬃciencies on the market which in return demands intervention by
the government. The comparative institutional analysis provides a normative
base for evaluating alternative approaches such as information campaigns or
state intervention. However, as the analysis shows the provision of post-
catastrophic ﬁnancial relief by the government is not an appropriate way to
intervene as it seems to be the source for another distortion on the market,
namely charity hazard. This phenomenon results from the individuals’ antic-
ipation of post-catastrophe governmental and private aid. The answer to the
question posed in the title, if charity hazard is indeed a real threat to natu-
ral hazard insurance can neither be answered with ”yes” nor ”no”. Although
rather logic and convincing from a theoretical point of view, certain points
of critique exist. Schwarze and Wagner (2004) propose that individuals who
have no insurance cover neither have information about federal relief pro-
grammes. The empirical review has shown that only a few studies exist and
the majority of studies actually does not ﬁnd evidence for charity hazard.
We can conclude that the scientiﬁc discussion regarding charity hazard is
far from settled. Future research should thus put more emphasis on the ef-
fects of governmental disaster assistance on individual insurance behavior. A
clearer picture of this issue can shed some more light on insurance behavior
and provide useful suggestions for restructuring public ﬁnancial relief pro-
grams. It might be prevented through some kind of mandatory insurance,
the redirection of governmental funds from post-catastrophe relief to pre-
catastrophe subsidies for insurance premiums or other protective measures.
Nevertheless, recommendations for public policy-makers demand a prelim-
25inary investigations of individual behavior under diﬀerent risk-transfer and
governmental assistance regimes.
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Abstract 
After the flooding in 2002 European governments provided billions of Euros of 
financial assistance to their citizens. Although there is no doubt that solidarity and 
some sort of assistance is reasonable, the question arises why these damages were 
not sufficiently insured. One explanation why individuals reject to obtain insurance 
cover against natural hazards is that they anticipate governmental and private aid. 
This problem became to be known as "charity hazard". The present paper gives an 
economic analysis of the institutional arrangements on the market for natural disaster 
insurances focusing on imperfections caused by governmental financial relief. It 
provides a theoretical explanation why charity hazard is a problem on the market for 
natural disaster insurances, in the way that it acts as an obstacle for the proper 
diffusion and therefore the establishment of natural hazard insurances. This paper 
provides a review of the scientific discussion on charity hazard, provides a theoretical 
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